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Abstract
This article demonstrates the uniqueness of cumulative causation in 
J. R. Commons’ Institutional Economics (IE). It highlights the following 
three points. First, it establishes causation with trans-action as the 
focus of both the institutional change theory and the value theory. 
Second, it defines conflict as instances of creativity and innovation, that 
is, momentum for institutional evolution. Third, conflicts puts a ‘will’ in 
trans-actions, which drives the evolution of institutions and values. 
This article emphasizes that the will is exercised actively during nego-
tiations, that is, will in trans-action is not a standalone authoritative 
will. Thus, cumulative causation in IE indicates the possibilities of 
bringing about institutional evolution through the will in transaction.
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1 Introduction
Cumulative causation is an important aspect of institutional economics (Kapp 
1976). It refers to a change in factors, progressing cyclically and cumulatively 
through reciprocal reinforcement. There are two genealogies of the theory of 
cumulative causation.
 In the first genealogy, which is widely used, analytical themes provide the 
dynamics of the macro economy. The beginning of this genealogy is marked by A. 
Young (1928) and it includes others like G. Myrdal (1957) and N. Kaldor (1966).
 In the second genealogy, analytical themes include the cumulative causation 
between a society and individuals. This focus on causation enables us to consider 
“cognition,” “volition,” or “choice of individuals” as they are socialized and simulta-
neously maintain their own singularity, without lapsing into “reductionism” or 
“totalism” (Bazzoli 1999, p. 128). T. Veblen is both the primogenitor and a 
pioneering figure of this genealogy (Veblen 1899). He formalized cumulative 
causation between “prevalent habits of thought” (institution) and “instincts” of 
humans, which explains why industrial technology is directed toward maintaining 
the “leisure class.”
 However, we cannot know the role of “will” or “volition” in either genealogy.1) 
There is nothing wrong with neglecting will in the first genealogy as it is based on 
macro analysis. The pioneering figure of the second genealogy, Veblen, dared to 
eliminate will from analytical objects, which may be appropriate in an ultra-long-
term analysis. However, when we consider the co-evolution of political and 
economic behavior, economic value, and institutions, eliminating the performance 
of will from the analysis may lead the theory to lose touch with reality. This is 
because, at least in the short term and mid-term, the ingenuity of the actors may 
influence behavioral and institutional change.
 It is well known that John Rogers Commons (1862-1945), who is said to be one 
of the founders of American institutionalism, constructed “volitional economics,” 
that is institutional economics with volition as an element (Commons 1927). 
However, there are few works on the cumulative causation of “institution”2) and 
the “institutionalized mind” discussed in his masterpiece, Institutional Economics 
(IE) (Commons 1934a) (Bazzoli 1999; Ramstad 1990; Zingler 1974). These two 
themes, namely, will and cumulative causation, are not appropriately connected. 
In other words, there is insufficient (Bazzoli 1999; Zingler 1974) or inappropriate 
explanation (Ramstad 1990) in the previous research regarding how will is placed 
 1) “Will” refers to the total inner world of an individual. “Volition” indicates active choice, that 
is, “performance,” “forbearance,” “avoidance,” and “timeliness” (Commons 1934a, pp. 305-306; 
1950, p. 149). This strategic choice, including deliberate “withholding,” is intended to control 
“proprietary scarcity” (Commons 1934a, pp. 198-201). “Timeliness” is the choice of appro-
priate time and place and degree of performance.
 2) In IE, institution, collective action, the working rule of a going concern, and order are 
different expressions indicating the same meaning.
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in the framework of causation, wherein the political and economic behavior of 
actors, economic value, and institutions causally circulate and co-evolve.
 Ramstad (1990) focused on the will of an “authoritative agency” as the driver of 
cumulative causation that chooses institutions. His opinion seems appropriate, 
but it fails to convey the essence of IE as the will in IE is the will exercised in 
social action, that is, will in “trans-action.”3)
 By analyzing Ramstad’s (1990) explanation of cumulative causation, this 
article clarifies the role of will in the composition of the co-evolution of the polit-
ical and economic behavior of actors, economic value, and institutions. If we 
consider the composition of cumulative causation in IE, while keeping our sights 
on will in trans-action, then, the uniqueness of cumulative causation is evident.
 The rest of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we critique Ramstad’s (1990) 
composition of cumulative causation in IE for failing to grasp the role of will in 
trans-action. In Section 3, we demonstrate the role of will in “trans-action,” that is, 
the tree type of “transaction,” which is bargaining, managerial, and rationing 
transaction, or the ultimate unit of analysis in IE. In Section 4, we connect trans-
actions as units, and indicate the composition of cumulative causation. In Section 
5, we highlight the uniqueness of cumulative causation in IE by comparing it to 
modern institutionalism, that is, regulation theory and historical institutionalism. 
Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional and individual causation
Ramstad (1990) is the sole work that discusses circular and cumulative causation 
between individuals and society to some extent.4) Ramstad (1990, p. 77) asserts 
that Commons (1934a) contains a framework of circular causation between “insti-
tutional causation” and “individual causation” (see Figure 1).5)
 3) The reason we use the term “trans-action” (Commons 1934a, p. 73) is to emphasize that it is 
not related to O. E. Williamson’s transaction-cost theory (Williamson 1986). Trans-action 
refers to a communication process. Hereafter, we use the term trans-action and transaction, 
but both indicate the same meaning, that is, communication in political or economic 
activity.
 4) However, as can be expected from the section title “XVII. A Digression on Institutional 
Causation,” Ramstad discussed cumulative causation within a space constraint (1990, pp. 
77-86).
 5) While Hodgson (2003) stressed that circular causation in IE is not perfected, I rebutted his 
assertions, based on the descriptions in IE. See Kitagawa (2016) for details.
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Institutional causation refers to reciprocal relations that follow two directions: 
first, institutions (customs and working rules of going concerns) create transac-
tions and economic outcomes and second, the outcome is a cause on which the 
perpetuation of each institution depends.6) Individual causation refers to reciprocal 
relations between experiences and will. The experiences that come from the outer 
world create “meaning,” “valuing,” and “choice” in the inner world. These internal 
activities result in actions7) that are conductive of the next experiences (Commons 
1934a, p. 95; cf., Dewey 1929, pp. 167-168). In individual causation, the inner and 
outside worlds are not divided, but interlinked at an interconnection point, 
namely, action (Albert and Ramstad 1997; Costa and Castro Caldas 2011, p. 675; 
Dewey 1922; Harter 1963, p. 227).
 Institutional causation and individual causation are connected by two links: 
 6) Following law or causation is involved in institutional causation. According to Ramstad, this 
is the law of supply and demand, that is, “economic law.” According to Uni and Nakahara 
(2016, p. 150), it is the cumulative causation of the macro economy. Based on Ramstad 
(1990), for Commons, “economic law” or “market force” arises from myriad transactions, 
which are controlled by institutions; therefore, the law does not exist prior to institutions 
and it does not evolve independently from the institutions. However, this article focuses 
only on the causation between “institution” and the “institutionalized mind” within 
“multiple causations” (Commons 1934a, p. 7).
 7) A brilliant explanation of the relationship between meaning, valuing, and volition is given in 
Commons (1934a, pp. 17-20) (cf., Mirowski 1988, p. 127).
Figure 1  Circular causation discussed in Ramstad (1990)
Source: Author
“Customary practices shape the will” link“The will chooses outcomes/working rules” link
Institutional Causation
Working Rules and Customs
Individual Causation
Purposes
Expectations
Ideas
Choice
Economic Values
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“customary practices shaping the will” and “the will choosing outcomes/working 
rules” (Ramstad 1990, p. 79). The former link indicates the expectations, purpose, 
ways of recognition, and ways of action converge of a certain type to some extent. 
When we designate this link as our starting point, institutional causation becomes 
the “cause” of individual causation as it is expressed in the expectations and 
purpose of individuals (cf., Biddle 1990a, p. 3). Commons borrowed the term “insti-
tutionalized mind” from E. Jordan to express the will internalizing institutional 
causation (Commons 1934a, p. 697, annotation 72; Jordan 1927).
 The latter link, namely, “the will choosing outcomes/working rules,” is the “voli-
tional dimension of action directed to the achievement of future end” (Ramstad 
1990, p. 80). Ramstad focused on the volition of “authoritative agency” (especially, 
courts of law), that is, the purpose.8) The authoritative agency chooses new 
working rules to fit with the purpose, which is the cause of action. The 
“purposeful thought” and the choice resting on the thought are “artificial selec-
tion” and a cause of institutional causation (cf., Ramstad 1994, pp. 109-111).
 Thus, individual causation and institutional causation form a circular loop 
through these two links. “If one is to understand why an individual has acted in 
the way he/she has been observed to act, one must evaluate the significance in the 
particular case of both ‘volition’ (‘individual causation’ as captured by the term 
‘methodological individualism’) and ‘working rule and custom’ (‘institutional 
causation’ as captured by the term ‘determinism’)” (Ramstad 1990, p. 97, annota-
tion 54).9)
 Ramstad (1990) asserts that the essence of Commons’ institutional economics 
is lies in understanding economic values in circular causation. On one hand, in 
mainstream economics, “the wills of individuals, as limited by their own endow-
ments of resources and the state of technology, are jointly the basic ‘force’ under-
lying, or fundamental ‘cause’ of, observed economic values” (Ramstad 1990, p. 83). 
On the other hand, in Commons’ theory, if we dare to set a starting point or 
cause, it is the purpose of the authoritative agency and accordingly, the agency 
“chooses outcomes/working rules.” “Orderly transactions” based on the “adopted 
working rules” create economic values (Ramstad 1990, p. 85, Figure 2). Thus, the 
realized economic values are observed because of economic coordination.
 Supporting this “reinterpretation of the etiology of economic values” implies the 
following two points (Ramstad 1990, p. 87). First, the amendment of working rules 
becomes a way of enforcing economic values that come closer to public purposes 
than economic values realized under the old rules. Working rules are evaluated 
and reformed based on gaps between public purposes and economic values, which 
are raised by transactions based on the rules (cf., Biddle 1990b, p. 31). Second, an 
issue that economists should address is redefined, from defining the goals that 
 8) The purpose of authoritative agency derives from the collective will of the principals.
 9) Italicized words are simply reproduced from the original, whereas bold font indicates 
emphasis by the author of this article. [ ] is a supplement of the author.
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principals or authoritative agents other than economists ought to pursue to 
“showing how the existing structure of working rules must be altered if the 
evolving purposes of the principals’ collective will are to be attained” (Ramstad 
1990, p. 87). Therefore, economists should first investigate the meaning of public 
purpose created historically in cumulative causation before thinking about the 
instrument of attaining the purpose.10) Adding to Ramstad (1990), this method of 
investigation completely differs from the one that considers prescription fitting as 
a given cause, that is, an a priori purpose.
 We indicate the following point as a counter to this explanation by Ramstad 
(1990). The point of view in which individual causation and institutional causa-
tion are units of cumulative causation ignores the uniqueness of IE in drawing the 
politico-economic system from “transactions,” rather than individuals or the whole 
society (for emphasis, “trans-action”). As the analytical starting point of Ramstad 
(1990) is placed in individual causation with regard to the will, the volition of 
authoritative agency is stressed. However, the will in IE means “will-in-action” 
(Commons 1934a, pp. 89, 640), or, to state it clearly, “will in trans-action.” The 
will is exercised during negotiations in each transaction.
 As Ramstad (1990) does not begin his analytical starting point with trans-
action, “social relations” contained in each transaction, that is “conflict,” “mutual 
dependence,” and “order” do not emerge (Commons 1934a, pp. 57-58, 92, 108). 
Then, what is the momentum that makes humans reconsider institutions and 
their habitual assumptions? Ramstad (1990) mainly focuses on “doubt” arising 
when an unintended consequence occurs, in other words, the motivation that 
wants to raise the efficiency of a “means” for a certain “end.” However, that is not 
enough because, as claimed by Vögelin (1995, p. 262), the uniqueness of IE lies in 
its focuses on “conflict” as a momentum of the “collective investigation” of actors 
(Commons 1998, p. 326).
3 Role of will in transactions
3.1 Bargaining transaction
A “bargaining transaction” is a transaction between equal participants in law over 
“proprietary scarcity.” Proprietary scarcity is a collective and objective value 
arising from joint expectation, which is the transaction, under the control of law. 
This refers to the “price” measured in terms of money. It depends on various 
10) When Commons discussed whether draft laws would be effective for certain problems, he 
considered not only the drafting of the law, but also the existing or attainable belief systems 
of the participants of transactions that would become norms at a meta-level, supporting the 
operation of the draft. His view, that it is the norms at the meta-level that underpin the 
workability of institutional reform, is expressed clearly in his key word “administration.” 
His method, in which he processes reasoning based on existing or attainable customs, 
differs completely from the method of economists who deduce from certain assumptions that 
are not based on experiences (Commons 1934a, p. 847).
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factors, such as institution of ownership, efficiency in output, desired output quan-
tity, coercion, and persuasion at a given place and time. However, the “measure” 
of value is only in terms of money; and not nature, labor-pain, labor-power, or the 
pleasure or pain of individual psychology. Therefore, “scarcity” in IE is different 
from physical and objective scarcity or physical and individual scarcity in previous 
economic theories.
 Commons indicated that previous economists, like J. Locke, F. Quesnay, A. 
Smith, T. R. Malthus, and D. Ricardo, became entrenched in the “substance” of 
value. In their theories, “real value” differed from “nominal value” based on the 
substance of value, that is, stable measures like labor and utility. However, prop-
erty rights that had been extended from “corporeal property” to “incorporeal prop-
erty” and “intangible property” were eliminated from the real value.11) If we 
analyze extended property rights, the “nominal value” itself is the sole analytical 
object of “institutional value.” Compared to classical economics, which eliminates 
price fluctuations, Commons believed that such fluctuations were “real,” and they 
affected the everyday economic life of various actors. In the following, the term 
“value,” that is, proprietary scarcity, is not equivalent to what some substance 
realizes by itself as value, but is collectively decided by the “price,” thus reflecting 
the five principles of scarcity, efficiency, custom, sovereignty, and futurity in a 
certain trans-action (Nakahara 2015). Therefore, it is not guaranteed that trans-
action value consists of “reproduction cost” or “marginal utility” (Commons 1934a, 
p. 175, Chart 4, pp. 180-181).
 Hereafter, we see how the will in trans-actions, conflict, and collective action 
are involved with bargaining transactions.
 Commons assumes two buyers and two sellers in his “formula of bargaining 
transaction” (Commons 1934a, p. 59) for the following two reasons. First, as we 
see later in this section, he wanted to treat issues of reasonable discrimination, 
competition, and control of the degree of discrimination and competition by sover-
eignty as a part of economic theory. This is value theory in the era of big busi-
ness. Second, he wanted to express the active choice of “finite human will” in 
transactions (Commons 1934a, p. 318). According to Commons (1934a, p. 320), the 
human being is not “an infinite being” who “can enjoy all possible alternatives at 
the same time and place.” Recoognizing the best and the second best opportuni-
ties, which are immediately executable opportunities in a certain transaction, the 
human will only chooses from the two alternatives. For example, from the stand-
point of B in Figure 2, the practical opportunities among infinite opportunities are 
$110 of S and $120 of S1.
 On the side of B, “higher outgo avoided,” that is, the “dis-opportunity-value” 
(Commons 1934a, pp. 312-313) is $10, which is $120 of S1 minus $110 of S. In 
this case, the “volition” of B is to avoid higher expenditure, that is, the choice of 
11) With regard to the extension of property rights, that is, evolution of the institution of prop-
erty, see Tsukamoto (2015).
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the two opportunities. On the other hand, the “opportunity-cost” of S (Commons 
1934a, p. 308) is $10, which is $100 minus $90 of B1.
 According to Commons, this “theory of dis-opportunity-value and opportunity-
cost” is a conventional way of thinking about the value of courts and businessmen 
in his era. As we will soon come across in this subsection, courts judge disputed 
bargaining transactions. This implies that sovereignty attempts to regulate the 
bargaining transactions under the worldview of the theory of dis-opportunity-
value and opportunity-cost. Courts investigate transactions similar to the disputed 
transaction, and then, explore whether the dis-opportunity-value in disputed 
transactions is similar to the dis-opportunity-value of other buyers in similar situ-
ations or whether the opportunity-cost in the disputed transactions is similar to 
opportunity-cost of other sellers in similar situations (Commons 1934a, p. 330). If 
the cases are similar, the considered dis-opportunity-value or opportunity-cost is 
reasonable. However, if the cases are dissimilar, the value or cost is judged to be 
unreasonable, and thus, become objects for correction. Such judgments, of course, 
become rules for future bargaining transactions.
 We set transaction value as $ x. $ x is the gross income of S and gross expendi-
ture of B. This means that in any transaction value, the two interests of the gross 
income of S and the gross expenditure of B are always in conflict. However, this 
apparently commonplace conflict is eliminated from classical economics because it 
makes an individualistic assumption that “we seek the largest possible net income 
regardless of the effect on other people” (Commons 1934a, p. 323). When we see 
economic activity as trans-action, it is brought into sharp relief that arbitration by 
collective action and negotiation is needed to enable transactions and reach settle-
ments.We can see more concretely that collective action and negotiation relate to 
bargaining transaction as follows. Bound between the upper limit of the amount 
asked of the seller ($120) and the lower limit of the buyer’s bid ($90) is a “limit of 
coercion” (Commons 1934a, p. 331). Sovereignty sets this limit by legal control, 
and the amount has been changed in successive periods. Legal control has been 
exerted over the following two issues. First, “discrimination” is settled when the 
prices asked by S of B and B1 are different. Second, “competition” is regulated to 
locate it midway between destructive competition and monopoly. To be specific, in 
Figure 2  Formula of bargaining transaction
Source: Author, based on Commons (1927, Ch. I, p. 15) and Commons (1928, r. 12, s. 762)
Economic Relations
Buyers (bid) ＄100 B Competition
(Opportunity)
B1 ＄90
Bargaining Power (Economic Power)・Moral Power Power
Sellers (asked) ＄110 S Competition
(Opportunity)
S1 ＄120
27
addition to the conservative regulation of unjustly high asking prices of sellers 
(regulation to S and S1 in Figure 2), the regulation of competition contains the 
regulation of price dumping of buyers (regulation to B and B1).
 Now, suppose that “fair competition” and “equal opportunity” are completed 
(Commons 1934a, p. 63). Nonetheless, based on Figure 2, there is a gap between 
the asking price of S and the bid of B. In this situation, negotiation becomes 
important. Negotiation consists of “coercion” based on economic “bargaining 
power” and “persuasion” based on “moral power.”12) Bargaining power is enhanced 
by collective action. Sovereignty attempts to accomplish the “equality of 
bargaining power” by approving or regulating the action. When a transaction is 
concluded based on persuasion, the transaction falls within the bounds of reason-
ability. At the same time, Commons believed that it is impossible to accomplish 
complete equality of bargaining power. In this way, compared to the common 
economic theory, in which income and expenditure are balanced in production 
cost, reproduction cost, or marginal utility on the condition of free competition, 
Commons believed that transaction value is decided by coercion and persuasion 
within the bounds of immediately executable opportunities.
 From our discussion on bargaining transaction, we can grasp the elements of 
the value theory of IE. The elements include the following three points. First, 
“cause,” “regulator,” and “measure” of value are collective actions, including 
money as an institution. Why were labor power, labor pain, psychological pleasure 
and pain, and natural law, among other factors, set as cause, regulator, and 
measure of value in the classical theories prior to Commons? Commons believed 
that this was because of historical demands. Further, majority of the people were 
starting to recognize the persuasive force of the theory (Commons 1934a, p. 197). 
However, it does not imply that Commons eliminated labor and utility from his 
value theory. Commons did not view them as substances of value, but as compo-
nents of value.
 Second, the historical evolution of the definition of proprietary scarcity, which 
refers to the evolution of property rights from corporeal property to intangible 
property, is seen as the evolution of collective actions, which include changing 
business customs, changing working rules of private concerns, and the accumula-
tion of the novel decisions of courts.
 Third, the will relates to the genesis of value; it chooses opportunities and is 
exercised in negotiations. Further, in bargaining transactions, negotiation implies 
coercion and persuasion.
 However, we should continue to focus on the core features of this unfamiliar 
value theory. In addition to the collective actions, the core features include social 
relationships, which involve conflict, mutual dependence, and order. If we capture 
12) Intangible property contributing to persuasion is “good-will.” Examples include “good credit,” 
“good reputation,” and the “industrial good-will” of wage earners to their employers 
(Commons 1934a, p. 82). These are moral relationships on the other side of transaction.
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the relationships, the starting point of value theory cannot be substance of value, 
goods, individuals, and exchange, but transactions. We do not presuppose that a 
stable substance of value really exists, which implies that no equilibrium can be 
automatically deduced from the assumption, and the value varies under the influ-
ence of evolving institutions and changing social, political, and economic situa-
tions. Therefore, the value theory of IE is connected directly to the policy implica-
tion that the politico-economic world needs coordination by private and public 
collective actions to realize stable values (cf., Commons 1934a, p. 214; Kitagawa 
2015).
3.2 Managerial transaction
Managerial transaction is the horizontal relationship between “command” and 
“obedience” within product organization with regard to “efficiency.” Broadly 
speaking, considering the example of a firm, on one hand, bargaining transactions 
refer to external affairs; on the other hand, managerial transactions refer to the 
relationships between superiors and inferiors. Efficiency refers to “the rate of 
output per unit of [labor] input, the man-hour” (Commons 1934a, p. 259). Each 
managerial transaction contains three social elements: advancement of technology 
(Commons 1934a, p. 294), development of managerial skill,13) and change of sover-
eign control over the “extent of authority” from a legal superior to a legal inferior 
(Commons 1927, Ch. I, p. 26).
 Of course, in addition to these social elements, will in trans-action is an impor-
tant factor of managerial transaction. What kind of negotiation emerges in mana-
gerial transactions consisting of command and obedience? In considering this 
question, the “negotiation” of Commons may mean general communication 
relating to economic activities. In managerial transactions, examples involve 
“directing” in order to operate subordinates effectively, “teaching” to establish the 
understanding of goals, and “inducing” (Commons 1934a, p. 67). These ingenuities 
of the superiors in communication cannot exist without subordinates. The reason 
Commons spoke of ingenuities is perhaps because of his confidence that the estab-
lishment or promotion of relationships of trust between management and labor, 
namely, “industrial good-will,” provides strong benefits for promoting efficiency 
and social order (Commons 1934a, p. 82). We strongly assert that, in managerial 
transaction, the generation of the value of efficiency is related to negotiations 
between participants, that is, communication between humans. In summary, the 
generation of efficiency is related to the technological situation at a given time 
and place, collective actions, and negotiation between participants.
 Now, how does the proprietary scarcity discussed in Subsection 3.1 and effi-
ciency discussed in this subsection relate to each other in a given going concern 
13) Examples of managerial skills include the scientific management of F. Taylor, which focus on 
Commons (1934a, p. 67) and, in the modern world, human resource management (cf., 
Murakoshi and Yamamoto 2016).
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and the entire politico-economic system? A hint is provided in the following ques-
tion and answer related to government and efficiency by Commons.
“The question of public policy, then, is the question of Reasonable Value: 
Should his largest selfish gain and least loss to self be secured for him, by the 
banking system, as a producer, or as a seller, or as a buyer, or as an ultimate 
consumer? (…) The answer to the political and ethical question would be then 
seem to be, Every	person	seeking	his	purely	selfish	 increase	of	profits	
or wages should get his largest gain as a producer through increasing 
his	 efficiency, not as a seller gambling on the rise of prices, and not as a 
buyer gambling on the fall of prices.” (Commons 1934a, pp. 799-800)
 From above quotation, we can understand two principles of efficiency and scar-
city as a combined challenge to sovereignty, not as distinct challenges. From the 
standpoint of the government, legal control targets the compositeness of the two 
principles. If we generalize this case, collective actions, which aim for the coordi-
nation of scarcity, include actions that also consider the coordination of efficiency.
 Hereafter, bearing in mind that Commons defined reasonable value as “a 
concept of collective action in terms of money,” we focus on proprietary scarcity, 
that is, price (Commons 1934a, p. 207). Nevertheless, both scarcity and efficiency 
are factors that determine the value in terms of money as they are mutually 
related.
3.3 Rationing transaction
Rationing transaction is the establishment or revision of the “working rule” of a 
sovereign, economic, or cultural going concern (e.g., government, firm, trade union, 
church, or family). For instance, it refers to taxation, fiscal or financial policy, 
labor management contracts, trade agreements, and the bylaws inside firms. In 
relation to bargaining and managerial transactions, rationing transaction is the 
decision, agreement, or compromise to coordinate the bargaining and managerial 
transaction institutionally at a given going concern(s). The “order” in IE relates to 
a continuously improving the dynamic working rule. The going concern is a 
bundle of the three kinds of transactions.
 The process of negotiation toward agreement is the process of collective inves-
tigation. Commons saw consequence as an “ethical ideal type,” which implies what 
the future “ought to be,” that is, an ethical goal. This is an investigational process 
found in existing practices and recognized collectively as workable (Commons 
1934a, p. 743). This ideal type provides certain futurity,14) that is, expectations of 
gains or losses in future, to members of going concerns. We may say that the 
formulation of an ethical ideal type is the challenge of actively and deliberatively 
14) “Futurity” and “institutional causation” are inseparable concepts in the point of view of 
Commons. See Gislain (2002) for details.
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constituting a collective expectation, that is, a state, firm, or cartel. The creative 
exercise of will in trans-action should be noted as this active constitution of joint 
expectation. The exercise of will, which attempts to gain a foothold when the chal-
lenge arises when undertaking an action in the here and now, creates imaginable 
order out of a chaotic future.
 Based on this collective investigation, we find evidence that Commons strongly 
believed in collective wisdom as the background of his interest in institutional 
change (Commons 1913, Ch. 1; 1998, p. 326).15)
“[M]ethods [of administration] are to be contrasted with those of individual 
investigators. Never can an individual investigator be found who can accurately 
be distinguished as both an extremist and reasonable within the extremes. 
Hence this kind of investigation is a collective investigation by all 
participants, typified by a staff of statisticians, and only a spirit of toleration 
makes it practicable to obtain willingness to cooperate by hearing and giving 
“due weight” to all augments and all participants in the collective action which 
always requires concessions on all sides. (…) These methods of reasoning 
and investigation are true also of all people and not limited to expert 
statisticians and economists. They are the plain everyday logic of 
looking for similarities and differences; of choosing between accessible 
alternatives; of avoiding extremes by joining with others in looking for what is 
reasonable somewhere between the extremes.” (Commons 1998, p. 326)
 His confidence in wisdom is certainly not in individual wisdom, but in collective 
wisdom. This is clear for the following two reasons. First, IE is based on pragma-
tism, which discusses the improvement of science or rules focusing on trans-action 
(Commons 1934a, p. 153). Second, IE is based on a Malthusian understanding of 
human beings. Humans are not rational beings, but beings of passion and 
stupidity. This is the reason why coercion and persuasion of governments and 
customs are justified (Commons 1934a, pp. 702-703).
4 Composition of cumulative causation in Institutional 
Economics
4.1 Mechanism of cumulative causation
By connecting the ultimate units of cumulative causation, that is, bargaining, 
managerial, and rationing transactions, we can provide the full composition of 
cumulative causation.16) Based on the framework depicted in Figure 3, we can 
15) This finding belongs to Takao Tsukamoto (Nihon University, Japan).
16) It is clear that this causation is “cumulative” because institution, or working rule, is the 
“production of cumulative change” (Mitchell 1937, p. 339). This cumulative production is not 
unambiguous, but is an object of meaning by present actors, depending on their future aims. 
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clarify the concerted evolution of transactions, prices, and collective thoughts and 
behaviors.
 Bargaining transactions are conducted in markets and managerial transactions 
are conducted within going concerns. One part of rationing transactions regulates 
the two types of transaction. This is “regulation of transactions at the micro level.” 
Another part of rationing sets the “mechanism of distribution of macro and mezzo 
levels,” in particular, “taxation, fiscal, and financial policy” and “rationing transac-
tions of private concerns.” The three types of transactions compose the politico-
economic system through mutual relations, that is, complement or constrain. The 
dynamics of integration of a myriad transactions, that is, “joint expectations” in 
monetary terms, is expressed by “widespread general price changes,” for example, 
wholesale price indexes, debt, and tax (Commons 1934a, pp. 122-124).
 The entire concept of proprietary scarcity has the following two features. First, 
there are unintended consequences for participants. This emerges inevitably 
because the whole concept of scarcity is a product of multiple causation, that is, it 
is a product of complexity (Commons 1934a, p. 7). Second, proprietary scarcity 
includes “reasonable and unreasonable values” (Commons 1934a, pp. 62-63). 
Reasonable value does not indicate a certain consequence, but a consequence of 
transactions that comply with certain conditions, namely, “equality of opportu-
nity,” “fair competition,” “equality of bargaining power,” and “due process of law” 
(Commons 1934a, pp. 62-63). These conditions are not given assumptions but 
goals to reach by collective action. Therefore, it cannot be said that the entire 
concept of proprietary scarcity expresses reasonable value.
 From the viewpoints of the participants, the entire concept of proprietary scar-
city is the compression of unintended consequences, expressed in terms of money 
in the following five principles: scarcity, efficiency, custom, sovereignty, and futu-
rity. The reduced expression, which can be recognized by the participants, 
provides a clue for the collective investigation of the next institutional coordina-
tion, namely, rationing transactions.
 This possible consequence is a cue for members of sovereign, economic, or 
cultural concerns to start collective investigation because the purpose of gathering 
members involves providing greater freedom and securing expectations and 
equality, both inside and outside the concern. To do so, they need to reconstitute 
their collective hypothesis relating to their way of perceiving things, their mode of 
behavior, and their way of collective regulation. In other words, a doubt over a 
habitual assumption and an existing institution becomes a trigger for the recon-
stitution of assumptions and institutions through collective investigation.
 Not only doubt, but also conflict triggers collective investigation. All transac-
tions, trans-actions that are targeted by IE, contain conflicts between participants. 
Conflicts awaken the participants to their common or differing worldviews or 
interests, which were previously out of their consciousness. When negotiations 
A typical example is the mechanism of making decisions by common law courts.
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reach agreements, sometimes the agreement is likely to be a “compromise,” while 
at other times it may be a “synthesis.” The latter is a consequence of the redefini-
tion of interests or a radical change in the worldviews of participants (Commons 
1934a, p. 101; Mead 1934; Albert and Ramstad 1998).
 This is the negotiation in which the will is exercised actively not only because 
negotiation is the process of clash of economic and moral powers of the partici-
pants, but also because in negotiations, it is possible to overcome dilemmas 
through mutual understanding and mutual transformation of the participants. By 
establishing novel ways of regulation or distribution, as described, sometimes the 
selves of the participants are redefined. Modern research, which sets “actors” and 
“institutions” as two ultimate units of analysis and attempts to connect actors and 
institutions, cannot grasp the redefinition of the self in the negotiation process 
(Boyer 2004; Denzau and North 1994; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck 2009). 
In IE, creativity and innovation inhabit the relationship among humans, but 
modern research fails to grasps this point (Commons 1934a, p. 153; Herrigel 
2010).
 The result of collective investigation, or rationing transactions, is that the 
working rules of regulations for transactions and distribution at the macro and 
mezzo levels are changed. In other words, changes occur in the way in which 
collective actions coordinate bargaining and managerial transactions and values 
that are consequences of the transactions. According to the normative discussion 
in IE, one of the aims pursued by going concerns with sovereign concerns at the 
top is coordination based on persuasion and inducement and not “oppressive, 
confiscatory, or exploitative” coercion (Commons 1934a, pp. 4, 672, 706). This aim 
is important because, it is a requirement for generating reasonable value that 
bargaining and managerial transactions are undertaken not under coercive regu-
lations but under persuasive regulations. Where this renewed collective action 
relates to transactions as regulators of value, they should be renewed continu-
ously for subsequent transactions.
 In this manner, transactions, prices, and ways of institutional coordination 
change in mutual relationships. The active driver of this evolution is the will, 
which is awoken by conflict and doubt. When we refer to causation, it refers to the 
concerted evolution of myriad horizontal and hierarchical relationships between 
participants in collective investigation and transactions. Proprietary scarcity is 
injected in the middle of causation, which is a reduced expression of compromises, 
synthesis, and uncertainty. According to the normative perspective of IE, 
“freedom, security of expectation, equality” of institutionalized mind and the 
persuasive propensity of the regulator of value, which are the collective actions, 
are increasing (see Figure 3: “More freedom, security of expectation, and equality” 
and “From regulation based on coercion to one based on persuasion”).
4.2 Mechanism of collective investigation
As indicated in Section 3, all transactions involve negotiation. In IE, the negotia-
34
tion process can be viewed as a process of “collective investigation” if we highlight 
the dimension of the search process of behavioral hypothesis and purpose. As 
Commons explained at great length in chapter II (I) “John Locke” in IE, a partici-
pant is not a “molecule” driven by powers of the external world but, they are 
“active organizers” (Commons 1934a, p. 153) who give original meaning to their 
environment and consequence of trans-actions. Therefore, institutional totality 
embracing participants structuralizes the trans-actions. At the same time, the 
participants reinterpret the institutional totality through collective actions. In this 
world, proprietary scarcity is an intermediary connecting institutional totality and 
the participants.
 We now clarify the role of will as an active driver of cumulative causation by 
closely analyzing collective investigation. In doing so, we should not forget that no 
economic trans-action or collective investigation ever takes place without a social 
relationship, that is, a conflict of interest.
 The buildup of trans-actions, in other words, the consequences of myriad trans-
actions, is expressed conclusively as proprietary scarcity. Specifically, it is debt, 
tax, or prices of goods and services (Commons 1934a, p. 122). As discussed in 
Section 2, this value contains various elements: five principles, namely, scarcity, 
efficiency, futurity, custom, and sovereignty; consequences that are intended and 
those that are not intended at the time of trans-actions, that is, security or insecu-
rity of expectations, expansion or shrinkage of freedom, and equalization or 
growing inequality; and compromise or synthesis of economic conflict. As proprie-
tary scarcity, in which these various elements are compressed, must contain unin-
tended consequences, it casts doubt on the collective behavioral hypothesis of 
participants.
 In IE, humans are conventionalized beings, and at the same time, have the 
ability to review customs carefully. They give meaning to the external world based 
on their habitual assumptions and continue to take action. However, when doubt 
and conflict arise, the habitual assumptions, which had not surfaced to the 
conscious mind previously, should be recognized and become the targets of reflec-
tion. Instead of faulty habitual assumptions, a new collective habitual hypothesis 
and purpose are constructed deliberatively. In this collective reasoning, two ways 
of reasoning are performed, “rationalization” and “insight.” Rationalization is a 
way of rigorous reasoning, such as deduction or induction. It is divided into “anal-
ysis” and “genesis.” The former is a process of classification. The latter is an anal-
ysis of change of the classified parts. Insight, like the reasoning of Peirce’s 
“hypothesis,” refers to “the union of analysis and genesis into a formula of the 
changing relations of the parts to the whole” (Commons 1934a, p. 99). Insight, 
rationalization, and habitual assumptions comprise of the institutional mind. 
These are, in fact, inseparable; however, they are separated for analytical conve-
nience (Commons 1934a, p. 747). This reasoning driven by conflict and doubt is an 
active performance of will. We emphasize that creativity and innovation in IE is 
not an attribute of human beings, but that of a trans-action.
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 Through this reasoning, collective purpose, hypothesis, and interest are recom-
posed, and then, trans-action based on this recomposition is dealt with. In this 
way, from the start of continuous trans-actions, whose quality transforms to some 
extent, the consequences of trans-action, purpose, hypothesis, and interest mutu-
ally changes in reciprocal influence. This is the way of continuous collective inves-
tigation (see Figure 4).
5 Uniqueness of cumulative causation in Institutional 
Economics
5.1 Trans-action as an ultimate unit
A characteristic of Commons’ cumulative causation is that the “ultimate unit” 
composing causation is trans-action (Commons 1934a, p. 4). When we understand 
this characteristic, it is inappropriate to apply familiar categories to it, namely, 
methodological holism (Aglietta 1976) or methodological individualism (neoclas-
sical economics), that is, micro, mezzo, or macro-level analysis. The trans-action is 
not an individual or institution, but a relation itself among citizens, between citi-
zens and going concerns, and among concerns. The trans-action ubiquitously exists 
at all analytical levels, that is, micro, mezzo, and macro levels. Moreover, IE does 
not insist on a problem establishment in which a micro-foundation is required for 
macroeconomics. The analytical starting point is neither micro (assumptions about 
the individual) nor macro (holism), but trans-actions. Therefore, cumulative causa-
tion in IE becomes far removed from the viewpoints of the following two works. 
First, Boyer (2004) provided the micro foundations for regulation theory by 
employing P. Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus.” Second, Veblen (1899) viewed the 
dialectic of instinct as the driving force of the evolution of the socio-economic 
system. Therefore, Hodgson (2003), who criticized IE for lacking a consideration of 
instinct that should be at the core of cumulative causation, did not understand 
Commons’ unique attempt to draw the evolution of socio-economics from an 
analytical starting point, namely, trans-action (Commons 1950, p. 75).
 We see this causation as the dynamics in which complement, mutual 
constraint, duplication, imitation, competition, and selection continuously work 
between trans-action, that is, the workings of inter-relationships (cf., Dubouchet 
2003, p. 85). One part of the relationships of trans-actions comprises of horizontal 
relationships, while the rest are vertical relationships. Therefore, cumulative 
causation is composed of pluralism and hierarchy of various citizens and concerns.
 However, if we only point out that IE draws its politico-economic system from 
trans-action, we cannot make a judgment stating that IE is a unique study in the 
field of institutionalism. For example, Théret (1992) discusses the mode of repro-
duction of severing the economic system from mediators, namely, law, and money. 
Now, with regard to the viewpoint of trans-action, what is the uniqueness of IE? It 
is that Commons drew a chain reaction of the evolution of institution and value to 
focus on the will in trans-action. In particular, the following two points are 
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notable. First, he constructed value theory, whose subjects are dis-opportunity-
value, opportunity cost, and negotiation. By doing so, Commons succeeded to 
convey that the human will is exercised not only in the choice of opportunities, 
but also in negotiation. Second, he clarified that collective actions are closely 
involved not only with the coordination of proprietary scarcity, but also with the 
evolution of the content of this value itself. Thus, cumulative causation in IE drew 
from trans-action, the co-evolution of relationships over transactions between 
participants, value, and ways of coordination among them.
5.2	 Conflict	as	a	moment	of	exercising	creativity	and	innovation
If trans-action is set as the starting point of analysis, it means that we start to 
analyze from social relations, that is, conflict. Modern institutionalism, in which 
an important theoretical element is conflict, is regulation theory. Boyer (1986) and 
Amable (2003) demonstrated situations in which a politico-economic system has 
been stabilized for a certain time period from the perspective of “institutionalized 
compromise,” which constrains the time period. Contrary to this theory, “conflict” 
in IE is viewed as the moment in which creative reasoning starts, in other words, 
it is a moment of generating new order. Conflict causes habitual assumptions, 
which have not surfaced in the conscious mind in the usual life of actors, to 
become objects of reflection. For example, through conflict, differences in the moti-
vation of the representatives of interests become clear. Then, a new way emerges 
that achieves consensus by utilizing the motivation of the opposing side, based on 
mutual understanding of these differences (Commons 1934a, p. 856). In the collec-
tive investigation of IE, this insight in the negotiation process sometimes results 
in the emergence of an innovative institution that has a novel incentive structure 
for participants. Then, the interests of participants and workable alternatives are 
recomposed by the new incentive structure. The uniqueness of causation in IE is 
that conflict is seen as a moment of “recompositional change” that is closely 
related to the evolution of habitual assumptions, interests, workable alternatives, 
and institutions (Herrigel 2010, p. 9). In other words, conflict is a moment of exer-
cising creativity and innovation.
5.3 Role of will in trans-action
The uniqueness of IE, particularly based on the discussion in this article, is that 
“will in trans-actions” rather than individual will is the driving force of the evolu-
tion of institutions and value. Will performs in the negotiation process of each 
transaction. For example, the active meaning of an environment, remodeling a 
behavioral hypothesis, withholding power and production at artificially high prices 
(see footnote 2), designing institutions that constrain or sublate conflict, and delib-
erative collective construction of expectation.
 IE is unique in that the composition of cumulative causation contains possibili-
ties in which the will in trans-action provides innovative consequences. Of course, 
human will was not considered by Boyer (1988), whose subject of analysis was the 
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dynamics of the macro economy, and Veblen (1899), who considered the ultra-
long-term cumulative change of human nature and institution. When we depart 
from the genealogy of cumulative causation and view political economies broadly, 
to explain “gradual transformation,” historical institutionalism focuses on the 
strategies of actors; for example, reinterpretation, conversion, and exhaustion 
(Hall and Thelen 2009; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck 2009). The focal points 
of these works are apparently close to pragmatism because they see institutions 
not as given structures, but as openings for actors’ interpretations. This interpre-
tation of certain institution is apparently related to the will of the actor. However, 
their discussions are structural for the following reasons.
 First, the whole discussion is from a stance that captures and categorizes the 
structure of changes. This stance itself is highly structural in nature.
 Second, it is implicitly assumed that there are external structures outside the 
relationship between certain actors and institutions (Herrigel 2010, p. 8). Social 
relationships, such as political and economic power relationships around an actor, 
limit his/her type of possible strategy. Social relationships that are awkward and 
structural establish the type of the actor. In an historical institutionalist frame-
work, will is only depicted as a projection of the external structure.
 By their nature, these works of historical institutionalism cannot depart from 
the viewpoint that grasps events structurally. To be specific, Streeck (2009) is 
highly pessimistic that it is or would be possible for collective action to change the 
trend of the politico-economy of Germany.
 Pragmatists neither presume an external structure and start their analytical 
description from it nor underestimate the creativity and innovation of actors who 
seek to open up new possibilities. More radically, historical institutionalism and 
IE have completely different senses of time. The sense of time that underpins 
historical institutionalism is from the past to the present, and to the future. In 
this case, there is an inevitable accentuation of the bondage of past, that is, it is 
structure or path dependent. However, for the participants of IE, to accomplish 
future aims, the past is exposed to fresh light from the standpoint of the present 
situation. This “past” is an accumulated form of the past, that is, history, experi-
ences, and institutions. From this viewpoint, the past is open to interpretation, 
and is considered as a cumulative resource that expands an actor’s range of 
motion and possibilities.
 In cumulative causation in IE, the focus is on the will in trans-action, which is 
seen as the driving force of evolution. For the role of trans-action, structural oper-
ation from institutional totality and path dependency are considered. However, 
this totality and the experiences that have accumulated historically undergo 
continuous reinterpretations in the process of the trans-action of participants 
(Kirsch et al. 2014, p. 220, Figure 9.1; Nakahara 2015). The active meaning of 
institutional totality and history is the performance of will in trans-action. This 
cumulative causation focusing on the performance of will in trans-action stands on 
the following belief and way of thinking of Commons. First, he strongly believes in 
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collective wisdom. Second, he sees wisdom and institutions as “means” for the 
purpose of controlling conflict and uncertainty, that is, “instrumentalism” 
(Commons 1934b, p. 160; Kitagawa 2014; 2016).
6 Conclusion
This article demonstrates the uniqueness of cumulative causation in J. R. 
Commons’ Institutional Economics (IE). It highlights the following three points. 
First, it establishes causation from the perspective of trans-action as the focus, for 
both the institutional change theory and the value theory. Second, this article 
views conflict as a moment of creativity and innovation, that is, a momentum of 
institutional evolution. Conflict is an inexhaustible force of co-evolution of the 
relationships of participants across transactions, value, and the working rules that 
coordinate them. Third, conflict places will in trans-action as the driver of the 
evolution of institution and value. It is well known that will is the element char-
acterizing Commons’ evolution theory. However, in almost all research on 
Commons, the will is designated as the will of an authoritative agency (e.g., 
Ramstad 1990). This article emphasizes the will being exercised actively in the 
process of collective investigation, that is, will in trans-action. Collective action is 
the regulator of value theory in IE. The power that drives collective action is will 
in trans-action. Cumulative causation in IE contains the possibilities that the will 
in trans-action brings innovative consequences, which is institutional evolution.
 In recent years, some researchers of global management, multinational enter-
prises, and welfare states have attempted to describe organizations or politico-
economic systems from the viewpoint of trans-action (Herrigel 2010; Kristensen 
and Lilja 2011; Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005). A few researchers of business 
history, who have attempted to demonstrate the methodological uniqueness of 
business history using the methodology of other social sciences, have highlighted 
the viewpoint of pragmatism (Bucheli and Wadhwani 2014).17) Economists are now 
expected to apply the pragmatist method to the targets of economics. This article 
demonstrated that Commons’ cumulative causation provides the starting point for 
taking the first step in this new direction.
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